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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 211 
Accident time: 06:40 Accident Date: 31/08/1998 
Where it occurred: Nr Route Arizona, 25 
Km from Brcko 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: 04/09/1998 
ID original source: WL/WM/IP/NH/SB Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
rocks/stones 
route (verge) 
trees 
Date record created: 15/02/2004 Date  last modified: 15/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: CQ 07603 65708 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: WGS 84 Gradacac Map series: WGS 84 
Map edition: 8 DMA Map sheet: 2784 1 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inappropriate vegetation cutting tool (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
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inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group were demining using two-man teams and a one-man drill. In this, a single 
deminer carries out all the appropriate demining tasks while his partner rests and "controls" 
him from a distance of 25 metres. A QA Monitor was on site, charged with ensuring 
contractual compliance, especially with regard "to working methods, safety and 
effectiveness". 
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by representatives 
of the regional MACs including two ex-pat Technical Advisors whose experience and ability 
came into question. The demining company and Monitor representatives challenged some of 
the report and gave some more information in their challenges. The entire file was made 
available and the following summarises its content. The original BoI report is reproduced in 
full (edited for anonymity) under Related papers at the "Other documents" tab. 
The demining company asked the country MAC for the information on mines in the area on 
16th July 1998 and the investigators could not determine why that information was not 
provided. [The demining company argued that this lapse was significant but there is no 
evidence that it contributed to the accident. As a result of the Board's findings, those 
responsible for the lapse were reprimanded.] 
The demining group started work at the site on 20th August 1998 and started work in the 
accident area on 23rd August 1998. The initial report of the accident from the demining 
organisation to the country MAC gave the wrong grid reference. At the site, a single Control 
Point controlled three working areas [presumably at safe working distances along the road 
verges]. The accident occurred on a verge beside a road. The report describes the verge as 
"thickly vegetated" with "grass, weeds and small bushes and trees". [A photograph showed 
tall, largely dry vegetation of sticks and grasses with occasional thin 4-15cm trees.] The 
deminers had been using a chainsaw to cut undergrowth, including small trees, despite the 
tool’s prohibition. 
 
[The picture above shows the accident site.] 
The accident report did not give details of what happened in the incident, but from other 
documents (including the statement of the victim's partner who was not available to be 
interviewed by the investigators during their site visit) it seems that the deminers started work 
at 06:10 and at 06:40 the victim took over clearance. The exchange of duty took place close 
to the accident site, possibly because the marking system was inadequate and the victim's 
partner had to explain where he had finished work. The metal contamination along the verge 
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caused by litter was such that the deminers found it impossible to use their Guartel MD8 
detectors, so they were clearing by prodding. The victim's partner began to walk "slowly" 
away. When he was about twelve metres away the mine went off. When he had last seen his 
partner, he had been wearing his full protective kit. 
 
[The picture shows the mine crater.] 
Photographs of the site showed the area with a chainsaw beyond a pair of long handled 
shears with one handle apparently missing. The victim's boots (damaged) and his safety 
helmet (severely damaged) were also shown. Other photographs appeared to show parts of 
the victim's legs or feet and a pool of blood. [An axe was found on the site and it was implied 
that there may have been reason to think it was being used.] 
The investigators found that Victim No.1 "lost both legs and one arm during the explosion 
and….had extensive damage to his head". His protective equipment "showed considerable 
damage…mostly to the left side and upper legs". Victim No.2 was about twelve metres away 
and sustained fragment injuries to both legs that were not "serious or permanent". The 
investigators thought it likely that Victim No.2 was shielded from further injury by Victim No.1. 
The helmet was subjected to a forensic examination that found to contain no trace of blood or 
tissue, so indicating that it was not worn at the time of the accident. The victim's partner 
disputed this, but had his back to the victim so it is possible that the victim removed his 
helmet without his partner knowing. The loss of both the victim's legs and the damage to his 
boots may be taken to imply that he trod on the device.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators found that the "supervision and management procedures at the site were 
minimal" as evidenced by infrequent on-site supervision, lack of end-of-lane marking and the 
use of the chainsaw. They found that both the demining group's management and the QA 
Monitor were responsible for this. They further found that the detector in use was capable of 
finding the PROM-1 mine in the area. 
 
Recommendations 
A lengthy list of recommendations included that drills and procedures and tools used on site 
"should be reviewed", power tools must never be used in clearance lanes, no striking or 
chopping tools should be used in the clearance lane and that trees 10cm or more thick should 
not be cut down. They reinforced the need to ensure that protective equipment was worn "at 
all times" and for the Team Leader to visit the deminers more regularly than twice a day.  
The investigators observed that recommendations made after previous incidents involving this 
group had not been  implemented. These were that manual clearance drills should be 
reviewed to include a second sweep with the metal detector after the vegetation was cut, that 
all signals from a metal detector should be investigated and removed, that full length end-of-
lane marking sticks [called "base sticks” in this theatre] should be used (the sticks should be 
painted brightly for ten centimetres at each end to show where lanes overlap). Further 
recommendations that had not been implemented included retraining, using dogs to check 
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lanes at deminer shift changes and that prodders should be revised to include a guide to 
prodding depth.  
A final recommendation was for an investigation into the MAC information department's 
failure to provide the mine information when requested, and for changes to be made "as 
required to prevent a recurrence". 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
Director BH MAC 
Director Federation MAC 
[Demining group] 
US State Department 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 272 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Head 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Arm  
Leg  
Leg  
FATAL 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No separate medical report for Victim No.1 was made available. 
Victim No.1 "lost both legs and one arm during the explosion and….had extensive damage to 
his head". His protective equipment "showed considerable damage…mostly to the left side 
and upper legs".  
No record of his treatment (if any) was made.  
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 Victim Report 
Victim number: 273 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Short visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Legs 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was not working in accordance with SOPs, and was not controlled appropriately.  
Victim No.1's injuries concentrated around his upper legs implying that the device detonated 
while he was standing beside it and with his left side more exposed. The damage to the 
shears and the concern about the axe may be taken to imply that he was clearing vegetation 
when the mine went off under his foot. Certainly he cannot have been prodding in a standing 
position. Regardless of the SOP, many deminers remove their helmets and/or visors while 
cutting vegetation, and it seems likely that this occurred in this case. The accident is classed 
as a "Vegetation clearance incident" for want of information to the contrary. 
The accident report was not detailed and some of the findings not explained, but the demining 
company and the QA Monitor's office responded with a vehemence that did nothing to 
improve the unprofessional impression of their field activities [relevant papers are held]. Their 
failure to recognise the failings of management and control at the site (especially the 
infrequent supervision and lax monitoring) imply that they were content with the work, which 
constitutes a significant failing of management systems. The secondary cause is listed as a 
“Management/control inadequacy”. 
The question of using two-handed shears in tripwire areas was raised. If tripwire feelers are 
used beyond the extent of the shears' blades, there can be an advantage in using two-
handed shears over one-handed versions. That advantage is one of distance from a blast, 
with two-handed shears usually putting the hands more than twice the distance from a 
detonation that a one-handed shear would achieve. The safety issue with shears is not 
straightforward, and includes considerations of the ease with which the tool breaks up 
(becoming fragmentation) in a blast, the ease of controlled use and the deminer’s preference. 
In several accident investigations during which photographs were taken, those conducting the 
investigation are shown ignoring the rules about wearing PPE in the mined area. This 
occurred during this investigation. The MAC may like to consider the message this sends 
deminers about the need for PPE rules to be enforced. 
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Related papers 
The Accident file included a detailed sketch map of the site, mined-area maps of the relevant 
area [that the MAC had on record but had failed to supply to the demining group], many 
photographs of the site and the scattered equipment. The site had a thin string between red 
tipped sticks as marking tape and the extent of the cleared area was hard to determine. The 
precise position of the crater was not clear, and no photograph of it was on file.  
Three letters dated 3rd November 1999 the MAC were on file. The letters are reproduced 
below, edited for anonymity. The original BoI report is reproduced after these letters, also 
edited for anonymity. 
 
Letter 1: 
To the Demining group: 
BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT 31 AUGUST 1998 
The Board of Inquiry’s report into the [Demining group] mine accident that occurred on 31 
August 1998 is attached. 
Previous accident reports have commented on a number of issues regarding your operations 
which apparently remain unresolved and it is obvious that the team involved in this latest 
accident were not following your own SOPs. The use of a power saw in the clearance lane is 
not acceptable, your SOP states that only horizontal cutting tools will be used to cut 
vegetation from the clearance lane. The use of a base stick to mark the limit of clearance in a 
lane is made mandatory in this country by the Mine Action Centre’s Technical Guidelines and 
you should include base stick usage as part of normal drills in your SOPs with immediate 
effect. 
The Platoon Leader involved in this accident clearly acted in a manner not suited to his 
position by allowing a power saw to be used and by not visiting the two-man team involved in 
the accident more than twice each day. His suitability for a position of such responsibility must 
therefore be questionable. 
Boards of Inquiry provide recommendations to demining organisations as part of every 
accident report. It is always anticipated that these recommendations are actioned promptly. In 
this case several recommendations from previous accident reports seem to have been 
ignored. 
You are strongly advised to read the attached report carefully and implement changes to 
operations as recommended. 
Signed: Director BH MAC 
 
Letter 2: 
Addressed to the Federation PIU 
BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT 31 AUGUST 1998 
The Board of Inquiry’s report into the [Demining group] mine accident that occurred on 31 
August 1998 is attached. 
Previous accident reports have commented on a number of issues regarding [the Demining 
group]’s operations which apparently remain unresolved and it is obvious that the team 
involved in this latest accident were not following [Demining group]. The use of a power saw 
in the clearance lane is not acceptable and it would appear that the PIU Monitor involved in 
this accident did not prevent or advise the team against using it. [The Demining group]’s 
SOPs and MAC Technical Guidelines were contravened in a number of ways and it would 
seem that the Monitor did not take any action to remedy the situation or to report the 
contraventions. 
The PIU Monitor involved in this accident clearly acted in a manner not suited to his position 
by allowing a power saw to be used and by not reporting or advising against unsafe and 
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dangerous activities in the clearance. His suitability for a position of such responsibility must 
therefore be questionable. 
Signed: Director BH MAC 
 
Letter 3: 
Addressed to the Federation MAC 
 
BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT 31 AUGUST 1998 
The Board of Inquiry’s report into the [Demining group] mine accident that occurred on 31 
August 1998 is attached. 
You will already be aware that the team involved in this accident did not have access to 
information available in the MAC database. The reason that this information was not available 
to the team is because the [Demining group] request for a Task Folder for this area was not 
actioned. 
This very serious omission was a contributory cause of this accident and it is very strongly 
recommended that you take steps to ensure that such an error does not occur again.  
Signed: Director BH MAC 
 
Original BoI report 
The original Bo! report is reproduced below (edited for anonymity). 
 
REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO ACCIDENT 31 AUGUST 1998 
4 September 1998 
 
References: 
Map WGS 84 2784-1 M709 Edition 8-DMA – Gradacac. 
[Demining group] SOPs dated 1 December 1997. 
UN MAC Technical and Safety Standards to amendment No. 4 Dated 27 June 1998. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. As a result of a mine accident on the morning of Monday 31 August 1998, a Board of 
Inquiry was convened by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre to investigate 
the accident on behalf of the Government and in accordance with the National Technical 
Standards. 
2. This is the third mine accident sustained by [the Demining group] this year.  
3. The Board comprised: 
a. Chairman - BH MAC 
b. Member – United States State Department 
c. Member – Operations Officer MAC Tuzla 
d. Member – Operations Officer Fed MAC Sarajevo 
e. Mr [name excised], representing [demining group] Corporation was present 
throughout the  Board of Inquiry investigation and interviews at the task site. 
4. A copy of the Board's Terms of Reference are attached at Annex A. 
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5. [Demining group] staff members were helpful and cooperative throughout the course of 
the investigation. [The demining group comprised a collaboration between international 
and National commercial companies.] 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS 
6. The following recommendations to [Demining group] from previous accident reports have 
not been implemented at this task site. 
• Manual clearance drills should be reviewed. They should include a second sweep of the 
ground with the metal detector once the vegetation has been cut away. All personnel 
should understand the clearance drills and they should not be varied without permission 
from the [Demining group] Regional Manager. 
• 100% metal clearance should be aimed for in all areas where metal detectors are used. 
All signals given by the metal detector should be investigated.  
• Improved, full-length base-sticks should be used. These should be marked with 
gradations at 2.5 centimetre intervals and 10 centimetres at the ends should be brightly 
coloured to show where lanes overlap. 
• Consider the use of dogs to check lanes as part of the changeover procedure between 
deminer shift changes. 
• Retraining should be carried out to confirm the following points. 
7. Manual prodding techniques. 
8. Procedures and use of metal detectors, including the confirmation of a second sweep 
over the clearance area in front of the base stick, after the grass has been cut. 
a. Where necessary lanes should be sapped to provide a base from which to search for 
buried mines. Consideration should also be given to marking prodder blades to show 
depth of penetration into the ground. 
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING 
9. [Demining group] were tasked by the PIU in accordance with the provisions of their 
contract. This Task was PIU number 049. 
10. A record of a request from [Demining group] Sarajevo for a Tasking Folder for this area 
is held at Federation MAC Operations department. MAC did not issue a Tasking Folder 
for this task. Reasons for this non-issuance are not clear at the time of writing this report. 
11. MAC holds information for this area and for areas close to this task site. MAC 
Information shows evidence of mined areas and of PROM-1 mines laid within the area of 
this task site. A copy of [Demining group]’s original request for a Task Folder, dated 16 
July 1998, and information held by MAC about the area is shown at Annex F. 
12. [Demining group] started work at this site on 20 August1998. Work started on the 
clearance lane in the area of the accident on 23 August. 
GEOGRAPHY 
13. Initial report from [Demining group] headquarters in Sarajevo stated that the accident 
had occurred at Grid Reference CQ 07993 66112. This accident actually occurred at CQ 
07603 65708. 
14. The task site where [Demining group] were operating is next to the Inter Entity Boundary 
Line near Route Arizona, approximately 25 Kilometres from Brcko. 
15. The task site encompasses three task areas, all of which are controlled from one Control 
Point, situated approximately midway between the three areas. A sketch plan of the site 
is shown at Annex B. Photographs of the site are shown at Annex D. 
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16. The task area where the accident occurred is a route verge, next to an unmade road. 
The verge is thickly vegetated with grass, weeds and small bushes and trees. The site is 
graded as Category C by the Federation PIU. 
PRIORITY OF TASK  
17. Priority was set by the Federation PIU. 
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
18. A plan of the site is attached at Annex B showing the areas of clearance. Marking in 
clearance lanes was adequate. 
19. The team working in the lane where the accident occurred was a two-man team, working 
a work-safety schedule of operations at half-hourly intervals. The man not working in the 
clearance lane would normally be approximately twenty-five metres away from the man 
working. 
20. The Control Point for the team was situated approximately one hundred and twenty 
metres from the site of the accident. The CP was on the road and downhill from the 
accident area. 
21. The Access Route from the Control Point to the clearance lanes was along the road. 
22. Marking of the area between cleared and uncleared areas was by use of red topped 
stakes. Red and white nylon cord was fixed between the stakes.  
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
23. The Platoon Leader, [name excised] normally visited this area of his task site about twice 
each day. On the day of the accident he had not visited this area because operations 
had been in progress for less than one hour. 
24. The [Demining group] Regional Manager, [name excised], had not visited this site. 
25. [Demining group] Operations Officer, [name excised], last visited the site on Saturday 22 
August. 
26. Mr [name excised], Regional Operations officer last visited the site on Tuesday 25 
August. Prior to 25 August, [he] was stationed permanently at this site. On the day of the 
accident [he] was in Drvar, as part of a planned move of operations to that area. 
27. Mr [name excised], [Demining group] Senior Dog Supervisor was at the site all day every 
day. 
A PIU monitor was at the site full time. Except for a two-week break, this monitor had been 
with this team since March 1998.  It is normal for every task site to have a PIU monitor 
deployed to it at all times when operations are in progress.  
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
28. Part of the Quality Assurance process is the presence at each site of Site Monitors 
employed by the Regional PIU, as stated above. The role of the Site Monitor is to ensure 
that the contractor carries out the work as agreed with the PIU, particularly with respect 
to working methods, safety and effectiveness. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
29. [Demining group] radio communications network is comprehensive and works well. Each 
Team Leader has a hand held VHF radio and is able to speak direct to the Platoon 
Leader, the Regional Manager and Regional Operations Officer. 
30. VHF radios are supplemented by vehicle-mounted HF radios. [Name excised] sent an 
initial report to [Demining group] headquarters in Sarajevo over the HF network 
immediately after the accident. He sent a full report over a public telephone near to the 
task site shortly afterwards. 
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MEDICAL 
31. A medic was at the site at the time of the accident, equipped with a comprehensive 
medical and trauma kit. An ambulance vehicle was also at the site. 
32. Deminer [Victim No.1] died from injuries sustained in this accident. It is reported that he 
lost both legs and one arm during the explosion and that he had extensive damage to his 
head. Death occurred very shortly after the explosion. 
33. Deminer [Victim No.2] sustained injuries. Injuries were fragmentation wounds and 
bruising to the back of [his] legs. No serious or permanent injuries were sustained. The 
injured deminer was approximately twelve metres away from the explosion. It is the 
opinion of the board that [Victim No.2] was shielded from further injuries by the presence 
of [Victim No.1]. 
34. Casualty Evacuation after the accident was reported as successful and efficient. 
PERSONALITIES INVOLVED 
35. Team involved in the accident was Team No. C2. Personalities involved in this accident 
are shown below. 
a. Platoon Leader  
b. Team Leader 
c. Medic  
d. No. 1 Deminer - Deceased 
e. No. 2 Deminer - Injured 
f. PIU Monitor  
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS 
36. The following tools were in the clearance lane at the time of the accident. 
a. A powered chain saw. 
b. A chopping tool with approximately 25 centimetre hooked blade. 
c. A hand file for sharpening tools. 
d. A manual prodder. 
e. A hand trowel. 
f. A broken, red-painted wooden marker picket, reportedly used as a base stick. 
g. A pair of long-handled garden hedge-cutting shears 
h. A Guartel MD-8 metal detector. 
37. During an on-site test the metal detector functioned correctly. The test was compared 
with a similar test at the same time with a MAC MD-8 metal detector. Both detectors 
performed the same. Soil at the site is not metallic or mineralised. 
38. The on-site test showed that a PROM-1 mine could easily be found in this area using the 
available metal detector. 
39. The cleared areas around and adjacent to the point of the explosion were littered with 
metal objects such as soft drinks cans, food cans, barbed wire etc. If the cleared area 
had been cleared to 100% metal free, these objects should have been removed from the 
lane. 
40. Platoon Leader stated that the power saw at the site was used for cutting down only 
larger-sized trees. The largest diameter of any tree that the members of the Board of 
Inquiry saw near the point of detonation was approximately 120mm. Evidence at the site 
showed that several trees and bushes, some less than 25mm in diameter, had been cut 
with the power saw. 
DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED 
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41. The mine involved was a PROM-1, bounding Anti Personnel fragmentation mine. This 
was confirmed by the discovery of the mine’s base-plate in the bottom of the crater. 
Photographs of the crater are shown at Annex E. 
42. The mine was in an area that had been previously worked in, approximately half a metre 
inside the cleared area. Vegetation, including small trees and bushes had been cut 
around where the mine was laid. 
43. This was the first mine to be found at this task site area. Several mines had been found 
at associated task areas but no PROM-1 mines had been discovered or reported. 
44. The mine was laid vertically, in a conventional manner, approximately two metres from 
the side of the road. A conventional tripwire, of the type issued with PROM-1 mines was 
laid next to the crater. It is the opinion of the board that this tripwire was originally laid 
with the mine. It is not clear whether the mine was activated via the tripwire or directly 
through pressure on the top of the fuze. 
45. Evidence from the clearance lane shows that the deminer who was killed in this accident 
was not more than half a metre away from the mine when it detonated. 
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
46. There was no evidence or suspicion of re-mining at any part of the task site. 
DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
47. Each member of the Demining Team was equipped with a helmet with a visor attached 
and a ballistic jacket. Both deminers were wearing a ballistic jacket at the time of the 
explosion.  
48. Examination of personal protective equipment showed considerable damage from blast 
and fragmentation. Mostly to the left side and upper legs.  
49. [Victim No.1] was wearing standard working boots. The left boot was almost completely 
destroyed and the right boot showed very severe damage. 
50. [Victim No.1]’s helmet was damaged in several places by fragmentation. No blood or 
tissue was evident on any part of the helmet. 
USE OF DOGS 
51. Dogs were available at this task site and used in other areas of the task site. No dogs 
were used on this particular area of the site because the vegetation was too thick to 
allow dogs access to the ground. 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF ACCIDENT 
52. The following account summarises the responses to questions by members of the Board, 
directed to Supervisors, Team Leader and team members. Statements are shown at 
Annex C. 
53. The team started work on the morning of the accident at the usual time of 06:00hrs. 
Work started as normal and [Victim no.2] completed the first 30 minutes shift in the 
clearance lane where the accident occurred. 
54. At approximately 06:40hrs, [Victim no.1] took over as the No. 1 deminer in the clearance 
lane from [Victim No.2]. The handover-takeover was conducted informally, next to the 
clearance area, less than one metre from the PROM-1 that caused the accident.  
55. Less than one minute into his shift the PROM-1 that killed [Victim no.1] detonated. 
56. When the accident occurred, [Victim no.2] was walking away from the clearance lane, 
towards his safety area, which was approximately 25 metres away. When the mine 
exploded, he was approximately 12 metres away, with his back towards the explosion. 
SUMMARY 
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57. This accident happened at the beginning of a working week in an area were the team 
had been working for several days in the previous weeks. One man was killed due to the 
extensive nature of his injuries. A power-saw and a manual chopping tool were in the 
clearance lane at the time of the accident. No site management personnel had visited 
the site for six days. Although the MAC holds information that shows PROM-1 mines had 
been laid in this area, this information was not available at the task site because 
Federation MAC Operations Department did not issue it as requested. 
CONCLUSIONS 
58. Supervision and management procedures at the site were minimal. Medical and safety 
coverage was in place and worked well. Drills and procedures should be reviewed. Tools 
used at the site should be reviewed. 
59. The Guartel MD-8 metal detectors in use at the site are capable of finding PROM-1 
mines in this area.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
60. The following recommendations are made from the Board of Inquiry. 
a. The use of dogs should be considered to check lanes as part of the 
changeover procedure between deminer shift changes in clearance lanes. 
b. Recommendations and relevant information from accident reports, including 
this report and the reports of [Demining group]’s two previous accidents 
should be disseminated to all personnel involved in the company’s demining 
operations in this country. 
c. Changeovers between deminers at changes of shift in clearance lanes 
should be carried out as a drill, in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs. 
d. Tools used in clearance lanes should be reviewed. 
(1). Power saws must never be used in clearance lanes. 
(2). Only horizontal cutting tools should be used to cut vegetation. No striking or 
chopping tools should be allowed into the clearance lane. 
e. Trees thicker than 100 millimetres in diameter should be left standing. The 
clearance lane should detour around the tree while maintaining a one-metre 
clearance lane width. The tree itself and the ground around it should be 
cleared, including the careful removal of branches and foliage as required. 
f. Helmets and PPE should be worn by all personnel at all times when at work 
in the clearance lane. 
g. The Task Folder from MAC Information Department should be made 
available to personnel operating in the field. This document carries all 
information held by the MAC about an area, including geographical 
information, minefield reports, and any intelligence held at MAC. It should be 
normal practice at the MAC to issue this information as requested and in a 
timely manner, prior to the start of any new task. 
h. Management and supervision structures should be increased and arranged 
so that all sites and areas receive sufficient visits from managers and 
supervisors. 
i. Federation MAC Operations Department should carry out the following 
recommendations: 
             j.          Carry out an internal investigation to determine why a Tasking Folder for  
 this site was not issued. 
             k.         The structure of filing and office management procedures should be reviewed 
                         and changes should be made as required in order to prevent a reoccurrence. 
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COMMENTS BY THE BOARD 
61. The use of two-handed shears for cutting vegetation should be discouraged. This 
should especially be the case in areas where mines with protruding fuzes or tripwires 
are suspected. The use of two-handed garden shears provides less control than 
smaller, one handed shears. 
Signed: all board members 
ANNEXES (not made available) 
Annex A  – Terms of Reference. 
Annex B  – Sketch map of site. 
Annex C –  Statements of team members. 
Annex D  –  Photographs of site. 
Annex E -  Photographs of crater. 
Annex F - Information from MAC Database. 
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